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Oracle Efficient Private Non-Convex Optimization
Seth Neel∗ Aaron Roth† Giuseppe Vietri‡ Zhiwei Steven Wu§
Abstract
One of the most effective algorithms for differentially private learning and optimization is
objective perturbation. This technique augments a given optimization problem (e.g. deriving
from an ERM problem) with a random linear term, and then exactly solves it. However, to
date, analyses of this approach crucially rely on the convexity and smoothness of the objective
function, limiting its generality. We give two algorithms that extend this approach substantially.
The first algorithm requires nothing except boundedness of the loss function, and operates over
a discrete domain. Its privacy and accuracy guarantees hold even without assuming convexity.
This gives an oracle-efficient optimization algorithm over arbitrary discrete domains that is
comparable in its generality to the exponential mechanism. The second algorithm operates over
a continuous domain and requires only that the loss function be bounded and Lipschitz in its
continuous parameter. Its privacy analysis does not require convexity. Its accuracy analysis does
require convexity, but does not require second order conditions like smoothness. Even without
convexity, this algorithm can be generically used as an oracle-efficient optimization algorithm,
with accuracy evaluated empirically. We complement our theoretical results with an empirical
evaluation of the non-convex case, in which we use an integer program solver as our optimization
oracle. We find that for the problem of learning linear classifiers, directly optimizing for 0/1
loss using our approach can out-perform the more standard approach of privately optimizing a
convex-surrogate loss function on the Adult dataset.
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1 Introduction
Consider the general problem of optimizing a function L : Ln×W defined with respect to a dataset
D ∈ Ln and a parameter w ∈ W: argminw L(D, w). This general class of problems is ubiquitous,
and includes combinatorial optimization problems, empirical risk minimization problems, and syn-
thetic data generation problems amongst others. We say that such a function L is 1-sensitive in
the dataset D if changing one datapoint in D can change the value of L(D, w) by at most 1, for any
parameter value w. Suppose that we want to solve an optimization problem like this subject to the
constraint of differential privacy. The exponential mechanism provides a powerful, general-purpose,
and often error-optimal method to solve this problem [MT07]. It requires no assumptions on the
function other than that it is 1-sensitive (this is a minimal assumption for privacy: more generally,
its guarantees are parameterized by the sensitivity of the function). It has indeed been used to solve
private learning [KLN+11], combinatorial optimization [GLM+10], and synthetic data generation
problems [BLR13] subject to differential privacy, often optimally. Unfortunately, the exponential
mechanism is generally infeasible to run: its implementation (and the implementation of related
mechanisms, like “Report-Noisy-Max” [DR14]) requires the ability to enumerate the parameter
range W, making it infeasible in most learning settings. When L(D, w) is continuous, convex, and
satisfies second order conditions like strong convexity or smoothness, the situation is better: there
are a number of algorithms available, including simple output perturbation [CMS11] and objec-
tive perturbation [CMS11, KST12, INS+19]. This partly mirrors the situation in non-private data
analysis, in which convex optimization problems can be solved quickly and efficiently, and most
non-convex problems are NP-hard in the worst case.
In the non-private case, however, the worst-case complexity of optimization problems does not
tell the whole story. For many non-convex optimization problems, such as integer programming,
there are fast heuristics that not only reliably succeed in optimizing functions deriving from real
inputs, but can also certify their own success. In such settings, can we leverage these heuristics
to obtain practical private optimization algorithms? In this paper, we give two novel analyses of
objective perturbation algorithms that extend their applicability to 1-sensitive non-convex problems
(and more generally, bounded sensitivity functions). We also get new results for convex problems,
without the need for second order conditions like smoothness or strong convexity. Our first algo-
rithm operates over a discrete parameter space W, and requires no further assumptions beyond
1-sensitivity for either its privacy or accuracy analysis — i.e. it is comparable in generality to the
exponential mechanism. The second algorithm operates over a continuous parameter spaceW, and
requires only that L(D, w) be Lipschitz-continuous in its second argument. Its privacy analysis
does not require convexity. Its accuracy analysis does — but does not require any 2nd order condi-
tions. We implement our first algorithm to directly optimize classification error over a discrete set
of linear functions on the Adult dataset, and find that it substantially outperforms private logistic
regression.
1.1 Related work
Objective perturbation was first introduced by [CMS11], and analyzed for the special case of
strongly convex functions. Its analysis was subsequently improved and generalized [KST12, INS+19]
to apply to smooth convex functions, and to tolerate a small degree of error in the optimization pro-
cedure. Our paper is the first to give an analysis of objective perturbation without the assumption
of convexity, and the first to give an accuracy analysis without making second order assumptions
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on the objective function even in the convex case. [CMS11] also introduced the related technique
of output perturbation which perturbs the exact optimizer of a strongly convex function.
The work most closely related to our first algorithm is [NRW19], who also give a similar “oracle
efficient” algorithm for non-convex differentially private optimization: i.e. reductions from non-
private optimization to private optimization. Their algorithm (“Report Separator Perturbed Noisy
Max”, or RSPM) relies on an implicit perturbation of the optimization objective by augmenting
the dataset D with a random collection of examples drawn from a separator set. The algorithms
which we introduce in this paper are substantially more general: because they directly perturb the
objective, they do not rely on the existence of a small separator set for the class of functions in
question. They also can yield improved accuracy bounds in cases where both techniques apply:
see Sections ?? and 5. [NRW19] also give a generic method to transform an algorithm (like ours)
whose privacy analysis depends on the success of the optimization oracle, to an algorithm whose
privacy analysis does not depend on this, whenever the optimization heuristic can certify its success
(integer program solvers have this property). Their method applies to the algorithms we develop
in this paper. Our second algorithm crucially uses an ℓ1 stability result recently proven by [SN19]
in the context of online learning.
2 Preliminaries
We first define a dataset, a loss function with respect to a dataset, and the two types of optimization
oracles we will call upon. We then define differential privacy, and state basic properties.
A dataset D ⊂ L is defined as a (multi)set of G-Lipschitz loss functions l. For w in a parameter
space W ⊂ Rd, the loss on dataset D is defined to be
L
(D, w) =∑
l∈D
l(w)
We will define two types of perturbed loss functions, and the corresponding oracles which are
assumed to be able to optimize each type. These will be used in our discrete objective perturba-
tion algorithm in Section 3 and our sampling based objective perturbation algorithm in Section 4
respectively. Given a vector η ∈ Rd, we define the perturbed loss to be:
L¯(D, w, η) = L(D, w)−
〈
η,w
〉
n
where n = |D| is the size of the dataset D. This is simply the loss function augmented with a linear
term. Let π be the projection formally defined in Section 3, which informally maps a d-dimensional
vector with l2 norm at most D to a unit vector in R
d+1. Given a vector η ∈ Rd+1 We define the
perturbed projected loss to be:
L¯π(D, w, η) =
L(D, w)− 〈η, π(w)〉
n
Definition 2.1 (Approximate Linear Optimization Oracle). Given as input a dataset D ∈ Ln and
a d-dimensional vector σ, an α-approximate linear optimization oracle Oα returns w∗ = Oα(D, σ) ∈
W such that
L¯(D, w∗, σ) ≤ inf
w∈W
L¯(D, w, σ) + α
2
When α = 0 we say O is a linear optimization oracle.
Definition 2.2 (Approximate Projected Linear Optimization Oracle). Given as input a dataset
D ∈ Ln and a (d+1)-dimensional vector σ, an α-approximate projected linear optimization oracle
Oα,π returns w∗ = Oα,π(D, σ) ∈ W such that
L¯π(D, w∗, σ) ≤ inf
w∈W
L¯π(D, w, σ) + α
When α = 0 we say Oπ is a projected linear optimization oracle. We remark that while it
seems less natural to assume an oracle for the projected perturbed loss which involves the non-
linearity π(w), in Section D.2 we show how we can linearize this term by introducing an auxiliary
variable and introducing a convex constraint. This is ultimately how we implement this oracle in
our experiments.
Definition 2.3. A randomized algorithm M : Ln → W is an (α, β)-minimizer for W if for every
dataset D ∈ Ln, with probability 1− β, it outputs M(D) = w such that:
1
n
L(D, w) ≤ min
w∗∈W
1
n
L(D, w∗) + α
Certain optimization routines will have guarantees only for discrete parameter spaces:
Definition 2.4 (Discrete parameter spaces). A τ -separated discrete parameter space Wτ ⊆ Rd is
a discrete set such that for any pair of distinct vectors w1, w2 ∈ Wτ we have ‖w1 − w2‖2 ≥ τ .
Finally we define differential privacy. We call two data sets D,D′ ∈ Ln neighbors (written as
D ∼ D′) if D can be derived from D′ by replacing a single loss function li ∈ D′ with some other
element of L.
Definition 2.5 (Differential Privacy [DMNS06, DKM+06]). Fix ǫ, δ ≥ 0. A randomized algorithm
A : L∗ → O is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private (DP) if for every pair of neighboring data sets D ∼ D′ ∈ L∗,
and for every event Ω ⊆ O:
Pr[A(D) ∈ Ω] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[A(D′) ∈ Ω] + δ.
The Laplace distribution centered at 0 with scale b is the distribution with probability density
function Lap(z|b) = 12be−
|z|
b . We also make use of the exponential distribution which has density
function Exp(z|b) = 1be−
z
b if z ≥ 0 and Exp(z|b) = 0 otherwise.
3 Objective perturbation over a discrete decision space
In this section we give an objective perturbation algorithm that is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private for
any non-convex Lipschitz objective over a discrete decision space Wτ . We assume that each l ∈ L
is G-Lipschitz over Wτ w.r.t. ℓ2 norm: that is for any w,w′ ∈ Wτ , |l(w) − l(w′)| ≤ G‖w − w′‖2.
Note that if l takes values in [0, 1], then we know l is also 1/τ -Lipschitz due to the τ -separation in
Wτ .
The Normalization Trick. The key technical innovation in this section of the paper is the
modification of the standard objective perturbation algorithm by introducing a normalization step:
3
rather than minimizing the perturbed loss, we minimize the perturbed normalized loss. Let D be
a bound on the maximum ℓ2 norm of any vector in Wτ . We will make use of a normalization onto
the unit sphere in one higher dimension. The normalization function π : Rd → Rd+1 is defined as:
π
(
w
)
=
(
w1, . . . , wd,D
√
1− ‖w‖22/D2
)
1
D
Note that ‖π(w)‖2 = 1 for all w ∈ Wτ , and also that for any w,w′ ∈ Wτ ,
‖π(w)− π(w′)‖22 ≥ 1D2 ‖w − w′‖22, (1)
since ‖π(w)− π(w′)‖22 = 1D2 (‖w −w′‖22 +D2(
√
1− ‖w‖22/D2 −
√
1− ‖w′‖22/D2)2) ≥ 1D2‖w − w′‖22.
This shows that normalizing into the (d+1)-dimensional sphere can’t force points too much closer
together than they start. The intuition behind the privacy proof is that the linear perturbation
term provides stability; specifically we will argue that for any value of the noise η than induces
a particular minimizer wˆ on a dataset D, there is a nearby value η′ that would induce wˆ on any
adjacent dataset D′. The argument proceeds by contradiction: suppose that there existed some
v 6= wˆ that was the minimizer on D′. Then since D and D′ only differ in one data point, the
difference between the normalized losses of v and wˆ on D′ can be broken into three terms: the
difference between their scores on D and the original perturbation term η, the difference between
their scores on the two data points that differ between D,D′, and the inner product between their
normalized difference π(wˆ) − π(v) with η′ − η. The first term is positive by virtue of wˆ being the
minimizer on the original dataset D. The second term can be lower bounded using Lipschitzness
of L. The third term is lower bounded using the fact that η′ − η is chosen to maximize the inner
product
〈
η′−η, π(wˆ)−π(v)〉 by making the change in noise η′−η move in the direction of π(wˆ) We
can only guarantee this has a greater inner product with wˆ than v if ‖π(wˆ)‖2 = ‖π(v)‖2 , which is
the rationale behind the normalization trick. Then the whole expression can be shown to be lower
bounded by 0, contradicting the fact that v is the unique minimizer of the normalized loss on D′.
Algorithm 1: Objective Perturbation over Discrete Space OPDisc
Input: D = {li}ni=1, oracle Oπ over Wτ , privacy parameters ǫ, δ
σ ← 7GD2
√
ln 1/δ
τǫ ;
Draw random vector η ∼ N (0, σ2)d+1 and use the projected oracle to solve:
wˆ = Oπ(D, η) ∈ argmin
w∈Wτ
L¯π(D, η, w)
Output: wˆ
We now prove that OPDisc is differentially private, illustrating the importance of the normal-
ization trick. We then state an accuracy bound, which follows from a simple tail bound on the
random linear perturbation term.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. For any realized noise vector η, we write wˆ = Oπ(D, η) as the output. Now consider the set
of mappings G : Wτ ×Rd+1 → Rd+1. If we can show:
• ∃g ∈ G s.t. wˆ = Oπ(D′, g(wˆ, η)) (Lemma 4)
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• Pr[η] ≈ Pr[g(wˆ, η)] (Lemma 3)
• W.p.1, argminw∈Wτ L¯(D, w, η) is unique, (Lemma 2)
then the probability of outputting any particular w on input D is close to the corresponding
probability, on input D′ as desired. Lemma 3 follows from simple properties of the Gaussian
distribution, and Lemma 2 from discreteness of Wτ , which are established in the Appendix. We
focus on proving Lemma 4, which is the central part of the proof.
Lemma 2. Fix any τ -separated vector space Wτ . For every dataset D there is a subset B ⊂ Rd+1
such that Pr
[
η ∈ B] = 0 and for any η ∈ Rd+1 \B:
∃ a unique minimizer wˆ ∈ argmin
w∈Wτ
L
(D, w)− 〈η, π(w)〉
Denote the set of of noise vectors that induce output w on dataset D by E(D, w) = {η :
Oπ(D, η) = w}. Define our mapping g ∈ G by:
g(wˆ, η)
def
= gwˆ(η) = η +
2
τ
GD2π
(
wˆ
)
Note that the vector η′ − η = gwˆ(η) − η is parallel to π(wˆ) . Lemma 3 shows that with high
probability over the draw of η, Pr
[
η
] ≈ Pr[gwˆ(η)].
Lemma 3. Let η ∼ N (0, σ2)d+1, σ ← 7G2D2
√
log(1/δ)
τǫ , and w ∈ Wτ . Then there exists a set
C ⊂ Rd+1 such that Pr[η ∈ Cc] ≥ 1 − δ, and for all r ∈ Cc if p denotes the probability density
function of η:
p(r)
p(gw(r))
≤ eǫ
Lemma 4. Fix any wˆ and any pair of neighboring datasets D,D′. Let η ∈ E(D, wˆ) be such that wˆ
is the unique minimizer wˆ ∈ infw L(D, w)−
〈
η, π
(
w
)〉
. Then gwˆ(η) ∈ E
(D′, wˆ). Hence:
I{η ∈ E(D, wˆ)} ≤ I{gwˆ(η) ∈ E(D′, wˆ)}
Proof. Let c = 4τGD
2. Suppose that v 6= wˆ is the output on neighboring dataset D′ when the noise
vector is gwˆ(η). We will derive a contradiction. Since v is the unique minimizer on D′:(
L
(D′, v)− 〈gwˆ(η), π(v)〉)− (L(D′, wˆ)− 〈gwˆ(η), π(wˆ)〉) < 0
Let i be the index where D and D′ are different, such that li ∈ D and l′i ∈ D′. Then L
(D′, w) =
L
(D, w)− li(w) + l′i(w). Now, write the loss function in terms of D and rearranging terms:[(
L
(D, v)− 〈η, π(v)〉)− (L(D, wˆ)− 〈η, π(wˆ)〉)]+ (li(wˆ)− li(v))− (l′i(wˆ)− l′i(v))
+
〈
cπ
(
wˆ
)
, π
(
wˆ
)〉− 〈cπ(wˆ), π(v)〉 < 0
Since wˆ is a unique minimizer for D and η then term in the square bracket is positive. Hence:
(
li(wˆ)− li(v)
)− (l′i(wˆ)− l′i(v))+ 〈cπ(wˆ), π(wˆ)− π(v)〉 < 0
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Since li, l
′
i are G-Lipschitz functions
(
li(wˆ)− li(v)
)− (l′i(wˆ)− l′i(v)) ≥ −2G‖wˆ−v‖2. Now comes
the importance of the normalization trick: because ||π(v)||2 = ||π(wˆ)||2 = 1,
〈
cπ
(
wˆ
)
, π
(
wˆ
)−π(v)〉 =
c
2‖π
(
wˆ
) − π(v)‖22, by expanding ‖π(wˆ) − π(v)‖22. Note that without the normalization, this last
term could be negative, breaking the contradiction argument. Substituting this becomes:
−2G‖wˆ − v‖2 + c
2
‖π(wˆ)− π(v)‖22 < 0
For the next step we use inequality (1). We also apply the assumption that for two vectors wˆ 6= v
the following inequality holds ‖wˆ − v‖2 ≥ τ .
c
2D2
‖wˆ − v‖22 < 2G‖wˆ − v‖2 (Inequality (1))
c
2D2
‖wˆ − v‖2 < 2G (Divide both sides by ‖wˆ − v‖2)
c‖wˆ − v‖2 < 4GD2
cτ < 4GD2 (By assumption ‖wˆ − v‖2 ≥ τ)
c <
4GD2
τ
(Divide both sides by τ)
This contradicts c = 4GD
2
τ .
Putting the Lemmas together:
Pr
[Oπ(D, η) ∈ S] = Pr[η ∈⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)]
=
∫
Rd+1
p(η)I{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη
=
∫
(Rd+1\B)\C
p(η)I{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη + ∫
C
p(η)I{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη (2)
≤
∫
(Rd+1\C)\B
p(η)I{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη + δ (3)
=
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
p(η)I{η ∈ E(D, wˆ)}dη + δ
≤
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
p(η)I{gwˆ(η) ∈ E
(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ (4)
≤
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
eǫp(gwˆ(η))I{gwˆ(η) ∈ E
(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ (5)
=
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(gwˆ(C)∪gwˆ(B))
eǫp(η)I{η ∈ E(D′, wˆ)}∣∣∣∣∂gwˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣dη (6)
≤ eǫ
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1
p(η)I{η ∈ E(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ
= eǫPr
[
η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D′, wˆ)]
= eǫPr
[Oπ(D′, η) ∈ S]+ δ
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where equality (2) follows from Lemma 2. Then inequality (3) holds because C is chosen such that
Pr
[
η ∈ C] < δ. The inequality (4) is from lemma 4 and inequality (5) is from the bounded ration
lemma 3. Lastly, equality (6) follows because the mapping η → gwˆ(η) is one-to-one. Also note that∣∣∣∣∂gwˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣ = 1 This completes the proof.
We now state the accuracy guarantee, which follows from a standard Gaussian tail bound. Then
in Subsection 3.1 we compare this guarantee to the accuracy guarantee for the competing RSPM
method for learning discrete hyperplanes, in order to shed some light on the accuracy guarantee in
practice.
Theorem 5 (Utility). Algorithm 1 is an (α, β)-minimizer for W∗τ with
α =
14GD2
√
2(d+ 1) ln (4/β) ln (1/δ)
nτǫ
3.1 Comparing OPDisc and RSPM
While both OPDisc and the RSPM algorithm of [NRW19] require discrete parameter spaces, OPDisc
is substantially more general in that it only requires the loss functions be Lipschitz, whereas RSPM
assumes the loss functions are bounded in {0, 1} (and hence 1/τ Lipschitz over Wτ ) and assumes
the existence of a small separator set (defined in the supplement). Nevertheless, we might hope that
in addition to greater generality, OPDisc has comparable or superior accuracy for natural classes of
learning problems. We show this is indeed the case for the fundamental task of privately learning
discrete hyperplanes, where it is better by a linear factor in the dimension. We define the RSPM
algorithm, for which we must define the notion of a separator set, in the supplement.
Theorem 6 (RSPM Utility [NRW19]). Let W∗τ be a discrete parameter space with a separator set
of size m. The Gaussian RSPM algorithm is an oracle-efficient (α, β)-minimizer for W∗τ for:
α = O
(
m
√
m ln(2m/β) ln(1/δ)
ǫn
)
Let Iτ be a τ discretization of [−1, 1]d, e.g. Iτ = [−1,−1 + τ, . . . 0, τ, 2τ, . . . 1]d. Let Wτ be the
subset of vectors in this discretization that lie within the unit Euclidean ball: Wτ = Iτ ∩S(1)d. Wτ
is τ -separated since any two distinct w,w′ differ in at least one coordinate by at least τ . Moreover
Wτ admits a separator set of size m =
2(d−1)
τ (see the Appendix of [NRW19]. Since the loss
functions li(w) = 1{w ·xi ≥ 1} ∈ {0, 1} and Wτ is τ -separated, the loss functions li are 1τ -Lipschitz.
By Theorem 6, RSPM has accuracy bound:
αRSPM = O
(
d
√
d log(d/βτ) log(1/δ)
τ
√
τǫn
)
By Theorem 5 OPDisc has accuracy bound:
αOPDisc = O
(√
d log(1/β) log(1/δ)
nτ2ǫ
)
Thus, in this case, OPDisc has an accuracy bound that is different by a factor of roughly d
√
τ .
However, the bound of OPDisc is better only when τ is greater than 1/d2, pressing the question of
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how to set this parameter. The trade-off is that setting τ too large makes the algorithm OPDisc add
too much noise to the objective, and our accuracy guarantee degrades very fast. On the other hand,
if τ is too large, then we can miss the optimal solution to a large extent. However, for practical
scenarios, setting the value of τ to be much larger than 1d2 gives a discretized decision space such
that the optimal answer is not too far from the optimal on the corresponding continuous decision
space. For instance, in our experiments, we set τ equals to one.
4 Objective perturbation for lipschitz functions
We now present an objective perturbation algorithm (paired with an additional output perturbation
step), which applies to arbitrary parameter spaces. The privacy guarantee holds for (possibly non-
convex) Lipschitz loss functions, while the accuracy guarantee applies only if the loss functions are
convex and bounded. Even in the convex case, this is a substantially more general statement than
was previously known for objective perturbation: we don’t require any second order conditions like
strong convexity or smoothness (or even differentiability). Our guarantees also hold with access
only to an α-approximate optimization oracle.
We present the full algorithm in Algorithm 2. It 1) uses the approximate linear oracle (in Defini-
tion 2.1) to solve polynomially many perturbed optimization objectives, each with an independent
random perturbation, and 2) perturbs the average of these solutions with Laplace noise.
Before we proceed to our analysis, let us first introduce some relevant parameters. Let W have
ℓ∞ diameter D∞, and ℓ2 diameter D2. We assume that the loss functions li ∈ L are G-Lipschitz
with respect to ℓ1 norm, and assume the loss functions are scaled to take values in [0, 1]. Our utility
analysis requires convexity in the loss functions, and essentially follows from the high-probability
bounds on the linear perturbation terms in the first stage and the output perturbation in the second
stage.
Algorithm 2: OPSamp
Input: Approximate optimization oracle Oα, a dataset D = {li}ni=1, privacy parameters ǫ, δ.
γ ←−
√
ǫ√
n
d5/4
√
D2;
m←− ln (2d/δ)2γ2 ;
for k = 1 to m do
η ←−
√
D2
√
2dǫ
250G2d2D2∞(1+log(2/β))n
;
Sample a random vector σk ∼ Exp(η)d;
wk ←− Oα
(
D, σk
)
end
λ←− 4D∞γ + 250ηGd2D2∞ + α10G ;
µ ∼ Lap(λ/ǫ)d;
Output: 1m
∑m
k=1wk + µ
Theorem 7 (Utility). Assuming the loss functions are convex, Algorithm 2 is an (α′, β)-minimizer
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for 1nL(w,D) with
α′ = O
(
d5/4GD∞
√
D2 log(1/β)√
ǫn
+
α log(1/β)
ǫ
)
where α is the approximation error of the oracle Oα.
The privacy analysis of this algorithm crucially depends on a stability lemma proven by [SN19]
in the context of online learning, and does not require convexity.1
Proof. For µi ∼ Lap(λǫ ), |µi| ∼ Exp(λǫ ). By Theorem 5.1 in [Jan17] which gives upper tail bounds
for the sum of independent exponential random variables, we can conclude that ||µ||1 ≤ r =
(1 + log(2/β))λǫ with probability 1− β/2.
Then by G-Lipschitzness with respect to the l1 norm, with probability 1− β/2:
1
n
L
(
1
m
m∑
k
wk + µ,D
)
≤ 1
n
L
(
1
m
m∑
k
wk,D
)
+Gr
We now focus on 1nL( 1m
∑m
k wk,D). By the convexity of the loss functions, we have:
1
n
L
(
1
m
m∑
k
wk,D
)
≤ 1
m
m∑
k
1
n
L (wk,D)
Since each 1nL(wk,D) is bounded in [0, 1] (since each li ∈ [0, 1]) and independent, by Hoeffding’s
Inequality (see Appendix) with probability 1− β/2:∣∣∣∣∣ 1m
m∑
k
1
n
L(wk,D)− Ew∗
[
1
n
L(w∗,D)
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
log(4/β)
2m
So it suffices to show that Ew∗[
1
nL(w∗,D)]−argminw∈W 1nL(w,D) is small. Fix w˜ = argminw∈W 1nL(w,D).
Now by definition of Oα, for any w ← Oα
(∑|D|
i=1 li − σ
)
, we have
1
n
L(w,D)− 1
n
〈w, σ〉 ≤ 1
n
L(w˜,D)− 1
n
〈w˜, σ〉+ α,
hence
1
n
L(w,D)− 1
n
L(w˜,D) ≤ 1
n
〈w − w˜, σ〉 + α
〈w − w˜, σ〉 ≤ ||w − w˜||2||σ||2 ≤ D2||σ||2, hence:
Ew∗
[
1
n
L(w∗,D)
]
− argmin
w∈W
1
n
L(w,D) ≤ 1
n
D2E [||σ||2]
Now by Jensen’s inequality, E[||σ||2] ≤
√
E[||σ||22] =
√
2d
η , where the last equality is by the variance
of the exponential distribution. Putting it all together, with probability 1− β:
1
n
L
(
1
m
m∑
k
wk + µ,D
)
− argmin
w∈W
1
n
L (w + µ,D) ≤ Gr + γ
√
log(4/β)/2 + α+
1
n
D2
√
2d
η
,
1Compared to the bound in [SN19], our bound has an additional factor of 2 since our neighboring relationship in
Definition 2.5 is defined via replacement whereas in [SN19] the stability is defined in terms of adding another loss
function.
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Plugging in the value of r, λ and expanding we get the following long expression:
G(1 + log(2/β))
λ
ǫ
+ γ
√
log(4/β)/2 + α+
1
n
D2
√
2d
η
= G(1 + log(2/β))
(
4D∞γ + 250ηGd2D2∞ +
α
10G
)
ǫ
+ γ
√
log(4/β)/2 + α+
1
n
D2
√
2d
η
= γ
(
4GD∞(1 + log(2/β))
ǫ
)
+ η
(
250G2d2D2∞(1 + log(2/β))
ǫ
)
+ α
(
(1 + log(2/β))
10ǫ
)
+
γ
(√
log(4/β)/2
)
+
1
η
(
1
n
D2
√
2d
)
+ α
= γA+ ηB + αC + γD +
E
η
+ α (Setting placeholders A,B,C,D,E)
= γ(A+D) +
√
BE + α(C + 1) (η =
√
E
B
)
(7)
The last step of equation 7 comes from replacing in the value of η =
√
D2
√
2dǫ
250G2d2D2∞(1+log(2/β))n
=
√
E
B .
Replacing back the values of A,B,C,D,E results in:
= γ
(
G(1 + log(2/β))4D∞
ǫ
+
√
log(4/β)/2
)
+
√
250G2d2D2∞D2
√
2d(1 + log(2/β))
ǫn
+
α
(
(1 + log(2/β))
10ǫ
+ 1
)
Finally, note that by the choice of the parameter γ, the first term has order at most that of the
second term, which gives our stated bound.
The privacy analysis of this algorithm crucially depends on a stability lemma proven by [SN19]
in the context of online learning, and does not require convexity.2
Lemma 8 (Stability lemma [SN19]). For any pair of neighboring data sets D,D′. Let Oα(D, σ)
and Oα(D′, σ) be the output of an approximate oracle on datasets D and D′ respectively. Then,
Eσ
[||Oα(D, σ)−Oα(D′, σ)||1] ≤ 250ηGd2D2∞ + α10G
From now on, let Σ = {σi : i ∈ [m]} be a sequence of of m i.i.d d-dimensional noise vectors and
W(D,Σ) = 1m
∑
iOα(D, σi) is the average output of m calls to an α-approximate oracle.
Lemma 9. If m = ln (2d/δ)
2γ2
, for 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, then, with probability 1− δ/2:
‖W(D,Σ)− Eσ[Oα(D, σ)]‖1 ≤ 2D∞γ
where the randomness is taken over the different runs of Oα.
2Compared to the bound in [SN19], our bound has an additional factor of 2 since our neighboring relationship in
Definition 2.5 is defined via replacement whereas in [SN19] the stability is defined in terms of adding another loss
function.
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The next lemma combines Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 to get high probability sensitivity bound for
the average output of the approximate oracle.
Lemma 10 (High Probability ℓ1-sensitivity). For any pair of neighboring datasets D,D′, let
W(D,Σ), W(D′,Σ) be the sample average after m = ln (2d/δ)γ2 calls to an α-approximate oracle.
Then, with probability 1− δ over the random draws of Σ,
||W(D,Σ)−W(D′,Σ)||1 ≤ 4D∞γ + 250ηGd2D2∞ +
α
10G
(8)
Proof. By lemma 9, If we run the approximate oracle ln 2d/δ2γ2 times on each neighboring dataset
D,D′, then by union bound we get that with probability 1− δ:
‖W(D)− E[Oα(D, σ)]‖1 ≤ 2D∞γ and ‖W(D′)− E[Oα(D′, σ)]‖1 ≤ 2D∞γ
Adding both inequalities and applying the triangle inequality
‖W(D)− E[Oα(D, σ)]‖1 + ‖W(D′)− E[Oα(D′, σ)]‖1 ≤ 4D∞γ
‖W(D)− E[Oα(D, σ)] −W(D′) + E[Oα(D′, σ)]‖1 ≤ 4D∞γ
‖W(D)−W(D′)‖1 ≤ 4Dinftyγ + ‖E[Oα(D, σ)] − E[Oα(D′, σ)]‖1
(9)
Lastly, by lemma 8,
‖W(D,Σ)−W(D′,Σ)‖1 ≤ 4D∞γ + 250ηGd2D2∞ +
α
10G
Theorem 11. Algorithm 2 is (ǫ, δ)-differentially private.
Proof sketch. Given a pair of neighboring data sets D,D′, we will condition on the set of noise
vectors Σ satisfy the ℓ1-sensitivity bound (8), which occurs with probability at least 1 − δ. Then
the privacy guarantee follows from the use of Laplace mechanism.
Proof. Fixing any two neighboring dataset D,D′, W(D,Σ) is the average of m runs of Oα with
dataset D and sequence of noise vectors Σ = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σm}. Let µ ∈ Rd be a random d-
dimensional noise vector µ ∼ Lap(λ/ǫ)d . We can write the output of algorithm 2 as a sum of
two random variables:
M(D,Σ, µ) =W(D,Σ) + µ
Following lemma 8, let λ← 4Dγ + 250ηGd2D2 + α10G and define set B as
B = {Σ ∈ R(n,d) : ‖W(D,Σ) −W(D′,Σ)‖1 ≤ λ}
Where λ is the ℓ1-norm sensitivity bound from lemma 10. Then, by the same lemma, the probability
that Σ /∈ B is less than δ, where Σ is samples independently from the Exponential distribution.
For any event S,
Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S]
= Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S ∩ Σ ∈ B]+ Pr[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S ∩ Σ /∈ B]
≤ Pr[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S ∩ Σ ∈ B]+ Pr[Σ /∈ B]
≤ Pr[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S ∩ Σ ∈ B]+ δ
(10)
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We can can rewrite the joint probability as a conditional probability:
Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S ∩ Σ ∈ B]
= Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S|Σ ∈ B]Pr[Σ ∈ B]
≤ Pr[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S|Σ ∈ B]
(11)
Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S|Σ ∈ B] = ∫
Σ∈B
pN (Σ)Pr
[W(D,Σ) + µ ∈ S|Σ]dΣ
=
∫
Σ∈B
pN (Σ)
∫
µRd
pL(µ+W(D,Σ))1{µ +W(D,Σ) ∈ S}dµdΣ
=
∫
Σ∈B
pN (Σ)
∫
µ∈Rd
∫
s∈S
pL(µ+W(D,Σ) = s)dsdµdΣ
≤
∫
Σ∈B
pN (Σ)
∫
µ∈Rd
∫
s∈S
exp (ǫ)pL(µ+W(D′,Σ) = s)dsdµdΣ
≤ exp (ǫ)Pr[M(D′,Σ, µ) ∈ S]
(12)
Therefore, Pr
[M(D,Σ, µ) ∈ S] ≤ exp (ǫ)Pr[M(D′,Σ, µ) ∈ S]+ δ
5 Experiments
For our experiments we consider the problem of privately learning a linear threshold function to
solve a binary classification task. Given a labeled data set {(xi, yi)}ni=1 where each xi ∈ Rd and
yi ∈ {−1, 1}, the classification problem is to find a hyperplane that best separates the positive
from the negative samples. A common approach is to optimize a convex surrogate loss function
that approximates the classification loss. We use this approach (private logistic regression) as our
baseline. In comparison, using our algorithm OPDisc, we instead try and directly optimize 0/1
classification error over a discrete parameter space, using an integer program solver. Although
this can be computationally expensive, we find that it is feasible for relatively small datasets (we
use a balanced subset of the Adult dataset with roughly n = 15, 000 and d = 23 features, after
one-hot encodings of categorical features). In this setting, we find that OPDisc can substantially
outperform private logistic regression. We remark that “small data” is the regime in which applying
differential privacy is most challenging, and we view our approach as a promising way forward in
this important setting.
Data description and pre-processing We use the Adult dataset [Lic13], a common benchmark
dataset derived from Census data. The classification task is to predict whether an individual earns
over 50K per year. The dataset has n = 48842 records and 14 features that are a mix of both
categorical and continuous attributes.The Adult dataset is unbalanced: only 7841 individuals have
the ≥ 50k (positive) label. To arrive at a balanced dataset (so that constant functions achieve
50% error), we take all positive individuals, and an equal number of negative individuals selected
at random, for a total dataset size of n = 15682. We encode categorical features with one-hot
encodings, which increases the dimensionality of the dataset. We found it difficult to run our
algorithm with more than 30 features, and so we take a subset of 7 features from the Adult dataset
that are represented by d = 23 real valued features after one-hot encoding. We chose the subset of
features to optimize the accuracy of our logistic regression baseline.
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(a) Accuracy versus ǫ. (b) Distribution of run time.
Figure 1: Accuracy and runtime evaluation of OPDisc, RSPM, and Private Logistic Regression
(LR) on the Adult data set with size n = 15682 and d = 23 features. The value of δ = 1/n2 for all
methods in all runs.
Baseline: private logistic regression (LR). We use as our baseline private logistic regression
which optimizes over the space of continuous halfspaces with the goal of minimizing the logistic loss
function, given by li(w) = log (1 + exp(−y〈w, xi〉)). We implement a differentially private stochastic
gradient descent (privateSGD) algorithm from [BST14, ACG+16], keeping track of privacy loss
using the moment accountant method as implemented in the TensorFlow Privacy Library. The
algorithm involves three parameters: gradient clip norm, mini-batch size, and learning rate. For
each target privacy parameters (ǫ, δ), we run a grid search to identify the triplet of parameters that
give the highest accuracy. To lower the variance of the accuracy, we also take average over all the
iterates in the run of privateSGD.
Implementation details for OPDisc and RSPM For both OPDisc and RSPM, we encode
each record (xi, yi) ∈ D as a 0/1 loss function: li(w) = 1[yi 6= sgn(
〈
xi, w
〉
)]. For both algorithms,
we have separation parameter τ = 1 and constrains the weight vectors to have ℓ2 norm bounded
by
√
d. In OPDisc, each coordinate wj can take values in the discrete set {−B,−B + 1, . . . , B −
1, B} with B = ⌊√d⌋, and we constrain the ‖w‖2 to be at most
√
d. In RSPM, we optimize
over the set {−1, 0, 1}d . OPDisc requires an approximate projected linear optimization oracle
(Definition 2.2) and RSPM requires an linear optimization oracle (Definition 2.1). In the appendix,
we show that the optimization problems can be cast as mixed-integer programs (MIPs), allowing
us to implement the oracles via the Gurobi MIP solver. The Gurobi solver was able to solve
each of the integer programs we passed it. The source code for OPDisc is available via GitHub
(https://github.com/giusevtr/private_objective_perturbation).
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Empirical evaluation. We evaluate our algorithms by their (0/1) classification accuracy. The
left side of Figure 1a plots the accuracy of OPDisc and our baseline (y-axis) as a function of the
privacy parameter ǫ (x-axis), averaged over 15 runs. We fix δ = 1/n2 for all three algorithms
across all runs. The error bars report the empirical standard deviation. We see that both OPDisc
and RSPM improve dramatically over the logistic regression baseline, showing that in small-data
settings, it is possible to improve over the error/privacy tradeoff given by standard convex-surrogate
approaches by appealing to non-convex optimization heuristics. OPDisc also obtains consistently
better error than RSPM. The algorithm OPDisc also has significantly lower variance in its error
compared to the other two algorithms. The right side of Figure 1a gives a histogram of the run-
time of our three methods over the course of our experiment. For both OPDisc and RSPM, the
running time is dominated by an integer-program solver. We see that while our method frequently
completes quite quickly (often even beating our logistic regression baseline!), it has high variance,
and occasionally requires a long time to run. In our experiments, we were always able to eventually
solve the necessary optimization problem, however.
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A Definitions
Definition A.1 ([GKS93, SKS16]). A set U ⊆ L is a separator set for a parameter space W if for
every pair of distinct parameters w,w′ ∈ W, there is an l ∈ U such that:
l(w) 6= l(w′)
If |U | = m, then we say that W has a separator set of size m.
Algorithm 3: Gaussian Report Separator perturbed Minimum [NRW19]
Given: A separator set U = {e1, . . . , em} for class Wτ and optimization oracle for W∗τ ;
Input: D = {li}i∈[n]
n← |D| ;
σ ← 7
√
m ln 1/δ
ǫ ;
Draw i.i.d random vector η ∼ N (0, σ2)d+1;
Construct a weighted dataset WD of size n+m as follows:
WD(D, η) = {(li, 1) : li ∈ D} ∪ {(ei, ηi) : ei ∈ U}
w ∈ argmin
w∗∈Wτ
∑
(li,pi)∈WD
pili(w)
Output: w
Definition A.2. A weighted optimization oracle for a class W is a function O : (L × R)∗ → W
that takes as input a weighted dataset WD ∈ (L × R)∗ and outputs w ∈ W such that
w ∈ argmin
w∗∈W
∑
(li,pi)∈WD
pili(w)
B Missing Proofs in Section 3
Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof. Since Wτ is a discrete space, by a union bound it suffices to show that for any pair w 6=
w′ ∈ Wτ , Pr
[
L(D, w)−〈η, π(w)〉 = L(D, w′)− 〈η, π(w′)〉] = 0. Since w 6= w′, they must differ in at
least one coordinate i. Condition on the realization of all of the coordinates of η but the ith, η−i.
Then L(D, w)− 〈η, π(w)〉 = L(D, w′)− 〈η, π(w′)〉, only if
ηi =
L(D, w′)− L(D, w) +∑j 6=i ηj(wj − wj)
(w′i − wi)
The expression on the righthand side is well-defined since wi 6= w′i. But then ηi ∼ N (0, σ2) even
after conditioning on η−i, and so its probability of taking any fixed value is 0. This proves the
claim.
Proof of Lemma 3.
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Proof. Fix any r ∈ Rd+1, w ∈ Wτ , and let v = gw(r) − r = 2γGD2π(wˆ). Note that ‖v‖2 = 2τGD2.
Fix an orthonormal basis of Rd+1, where the first basis vector b1 is parallel to v. Let r
[1] be the
projection of r onto the direction of b1. Then by Lemma 17 in [NRW19]:
p(r) ≤ exp
(
1
2σ2
(
‖v‖22 + 2‖v‖2‖r[1]‖2
))
p(gw(r)) (13)
The ratio p(r)/p(gw(r)) is bounded by exp (ǫ) in the event that ‖r[1]‖2 < 2σ2ǫ/‖v‖2 − ‖v‖2/2.
||r[1]||2 ∼ |λ|, where λ ∼ N (0, σ2), and so using a tail bound for the χ2 random variable, ‖r[1]‖2 <
2σ2ǫ/‖v‖2 − ‖v‖2/2 with probability 1− δ so long as σ = c‖v‖2
√
ln (1/δ)
2ǫ for c ≥ 3.5. Since we have
that ‖v‖2 = 2τGD2, for us it suffices to set σ =
7GD2
√
ln (1/δ)
2ǫτ . Let Λ = σ
2ǫ/‖v‖2 − ‖v‖2/2 and
define the set C = {η : ‖η[1]‖2 > Λ}. Then since Pr
[
η ∈ C] < δ, we are done.
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. Write wˆ = Oπ(D, η). We first want to show that there exists a mapping gwˆ : Rd+1 → Rd+1
such that wˆ is the parameter vector output on any neighboring dataset D′ when the noise vector
is realized as gwˆ(η): that is, wˆ = Oπ(D′, gwˆ(η)). Let S ⊂ Wτ be a subset of discrete parameters. If
we can show that Pr
[
S
] ≈ Pr[gwˆ(S)], then the probability of outputting any particular w on input
D should be close to the corresponding probability, on input D′ as desired. Denote the set of of
noise vectors that induce output w on dataset D by E(D, w) = {η : Oπ(D, η) = w}. Define our
mapping:
gwˆ(η) = η +
2
τ
GD2π
(
wˆ
)
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We now use the 3 key Lemmas to finish the privacy proof. Putting it all together:
Pr
[Oπ(D, η) ∈ S] = Pr[η ∈⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)]
=
∫
Rd+1
p(η)1{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη
=
∫
(Rd+1\B)\C
p(η)1{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη + ∫
C
p(η)1{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη
≤
∫
(Rd+1\C)\B
p(η)1{η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D, wˆ)}dη + δ (Lemma 2, Pr[η ∈ C] < δ)
=
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
p(η)1{η ∈ E(D, wˆ)}dη + δ
≤
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
p(η)1{gwˆ(η) ∈ E
(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ (Lemma 4)
≤
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(C∪B)
exp(ǫ)p(gwˆ(η))1{gwˆ(η) ∈ E
(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ (bounded ratio)
=
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1\(gwˆ(C)∪gwˆ(B))
exp(ǫ)p(η)1{η ∈ E(D′, wˆ)}∣∣∣∣∂gwˆ∂η
∣∣∣∣dη (η → gwˆ(η))
≤ exp(ǫ)
∑
wˆ∈S
∫
Rd+1
p(η)1{η ∈ E(D′, wˆ)}dη + δ
= exp(ǫ)Pr
[
η ∈
⋃
wˆ
E(D′, wˆ)]
= exp(ǫ)Pr
[Oπ(D′, η) ∈ S]+ δ
This completes the proof.
C Missing Proofs in Section 4
Proof of Lemma 9
Proof. If we denote w(σ) = Oα(D, σ) as the output of an approximate oracle on dataset D induced
by a realization of the noise vector σ, then w(σ1), . . . w(σm) are m independent random variables
with −D ≤ w(σi)j ≤ D for all i and for each coordinate j ≤ d.
For any index coordinate j, let Xi = (w(σ
i)j + D)/2D, S =
1
m
∑m
i Xi and µS = E[S]. Since
0 ≤ Xi ≤ 1, by Chernoff bound we have
Pr
[
S > µS + γ
]
< e−2mγ
2
Pr
[ 1
m
m∑
i
(w(σi)j +D)/2D > µS + γ
]
< e−2mγ
2
Pr
[ 1
m
m∑
i
w(σi)j > 2DµS −D + 2Dγ
]
< e−2mγ
2
Pr
[W(D,Σ)j > Eσ[Oα(D, σ)]j + 2Dγ] < e−2mγ2
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Plugging in the value of m = − ln (δ/(2d))2γ2 we get:
Pr
[W(D,Σ)j − Eσ[Oα(D, σ)]j > 2Dγ] < δ/(2d)
Pr
[W(D,Σ)j − Eσ[Oα(D, σ)]j < −2Dγ] < δ/(2d)
Thus, by union bound
Pr
[‖W(D,Σ)−E[Oα(D, σ)]‖1 > 2Dγ] ≤ d∑
j=1
Pr
[∣∣W(D,Σ)j−E[Oα(D, σ)j ]∣∣ > 2Dγ] < d∑
j=1
δ/(2d) = δ/2
D Experiments Details
D.1 Implentation Details
The implementation is written in Python and uses Gurobi as a solver. We run the experiments on
a server machine with an 8-core AMD processor and 192 GB of RAM.
D.2 Mixed Integer Programs for OPDisc and RSPM
We use a mixed integer programs (MIP) to encode the optimization problems of OPDisc and
RSPM over the space of d-dimentional discrete halfspaces. The input to our algorithm is a dataset
{(xi, yi)}n where xi ∈ Rd, y ∈ {−1, 1} and a noise vector η ∈ Rd+1. The discretization parameter
is τ and D is the ℓ2-norm bound of W .
min
w∈W
n∑
i=1
ei −
d∑
i=1
ηiwi/D − ηd+1λ/D
s.t. yi
d∑
j=1
wjxj + cei > 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
λ2 + ‖w‖22 ≤ D2
ei ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ [n]
wj ∈ τZ ∀j ∈ [d]
(14)
Figure 2: MIP oracle used by OPDisc. The MIP consist of n integral constraints, d linear and 1
quadratic constraint.
In OPDisc, the objective we want to minimize is L(D, w)− 〈η, π(w)〉 which we can rewrite as
L(D, w)−
d∑
i=1
ηiwi/D − ηd+1
√
D2 − ‖w‖22/D (15)
The loss term L(D, w) in the objective is encoded as a sum of n binary variables ei ∈ {0, 1}, such
that if ei = 0 only then the constraint yi
〈
w, xi
〉
> 0must be satisfied. Thus, the sum
∑n
i=0 ei is equal
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to the number of misclassified samples. For each i ∈ [n], we enconde the constraint corresponding
to ei in our MIP by the inequality yi
〈
w, xi
〉
+ cei > 0 where c is a large enough constant with
c > maxx,w ‖x‖2‖w‖2. The third term in the objective function 15 is non-linear but we can express
it as linear term in the objective by introducing the slack variable λ. Then, in order to force the
condition that λ =
√
D2 − ‖w‖22 we add the quadratic constraint λ2 + ‖w‖22 ≤ D2.
min
w∈W
n∑
i=1
ei −
d∑
i=1
ηiwi
s.t. yi
d∑
j=1
wjxj + cei > 0 ∀i ∈ [n]
ei ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ [n]
− 1 ≤ wj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [d]
wj ∈ τZ ∀j ∈ [d]
(16)
Figure 3: MIP oracle used by RSPM. The MIP consist of n integral constraints, and d linear
constraint.
In RSPM, we are simply optimizing the 0-1 loss over the augmented data set, including the
input data set as well as the weighted examples from the separator set.
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